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Abstract:  The first part of the following paper deals with varying points of criticism forwarded against 
Ordoliberalism. Here, it is not the aim to directly falsify each argument on its own; rather, the author tries to 
give a precise overview of the spectrum of critique. The second section picks out one argument of critical 
review – namely that the ordoliberal concept of the state is somewhat elitist and grounded on intellectual 
experts. Based on the previous sections, the final part differentiates two kinds of genesis of norms: an 
evolutionary and an elitist one – both (latently) present within Ordoliberalism. In combination with the two-
level differentiation between individual and regulatory ethics, the essay allows for a distinction between 
individual-ethical norms based on an evolutionary genesis of norms and regulatory-ethical norms based on 
an elitist understanding of norms. A by-product of the author’s argument is a (further) demarcation within 
neoliberalism.   
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“Die Wettbewerbsordnung verwirklicht sich nicht von selbst. 
Sie ist in diesem Sinne keine natürliche Ordnung, kein ordre 
naturel. Es genügt nicht, gewisse Prinzipien des Rechts zu 
verwirklichen und im übrigen die Entwicklung der 
Wirtschaftsordnung sich selbst zu überlassen. [..] Gesetzte 
Ordnungen sind solche, die auf Grund einer 
wirtschaftspolitischen Gesamtentscheidung ein Ordnungs-
prinzip in einer Wirtschaftsverfassung zur Geltung bringen. 
[…] Es zeigt sich, daß die Politik der Wettbewerbsordnung 
[…] von einer Gesamtentscheidung ausgeht und eine 
Wirtschaftsverfassung aufstellt, mit anderen Worten, daß sie 
eine Ordnung setzen will.“  
(Walter Eucken 1952/2004: p. 373) 
1. Introduction  
Many people have criticized Ordoliberalism from different perspectives and for different 
reasons. Three main groups of (interdependent) arguments can be distinguished in this 
regard: 1. critique put forward by the spokespersons of Catholic social teaching and 
Catholic social ethics, especially von Nell-Breuning, Nawroth, Höffner, and Emunds; 2. 
objections made by Foucault himself and his successors (i.e. Foucault-  and 
Governmentality-Studies); and 3. critique expressed by Haselbach and Ptak accusing 
Ordoliberalism for its alleged Authoritarian Liberalism.  
Several of these accusations may be refuted referring to the primary literature of 
Alexander Rüstow, Wilhelm Röpke, Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm and others.
1
                                                           
1 Cp. Klump/Wörsdörfer 2009; Wörsdörfer 2010 and Wörsdörfer (forthcoming). 
  What is 
necessary is a less stereotypical and less prejudiced way of interpretation and a more 
sophisticated one. In this regard, a distinction between the individual representatives and Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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between the concepts of the Freiburg School of Law and Economics, Ordoliberalism in the 
broader sense respectively Sociological Neoliberalism/Economic Humanism, the (original) 
concept of Social Market Economy and Anglo-American Neoliberalism (i.e. Reagonomics 
and Thatcherism resting on the Washington Consensus) is absolutely essential: these 
unlike terms have to be kept conceptually apart.
2
My paper addresses these questions in three steps: Part one deals with varying points of 
criticism forwarded against Ordoliberalism (chapter 2). Here, it is not the aim to directly 
falsify each argument on its own; rather, I try to give a precise overview of the spectrum of 
critique. The second section picks out one argument of critical review – namely that the 
ordoliberal concept of the state is somewhat elitist and based on intellectual experts 
(chapter 3). Based on the previous sections, the final part differentiates two kinds of 
genesis of norms: an evolutionary and an elitist one –  both (latently) present within 
Ordoliberalism (chapter 4). In combination with my essay on individual and regulatory 
ethics
 Nevertheless, the subsequent critique of 
Ordoliberalism is worth studying – at least from one economic-ethical point of view: most 
of the critique put forward is used by many economic ethicists (e.g. Ulrich’s concept of 
Integrative Ethics) and by the ‘anti-globalization movement’ as well in order to refute 
neoliberalism in its entirety. Moreover, the upcoming literature touches upon a topic which 
has received surprisingly little attention so far – the intellectual elitism latently integrated in 
Ordoliberalism. Therefore, it is the aim of the following paper to systematically explore and 
analyze this kind of criticism and to link it with one of the central topics of the Cluster of 
Excellence ‘The Formation of Normative Orders’: the formation and emergence of norms.  
3
2. Criticizing Ordoliberalism    
, the following paper allows for a distinction between individual-ethical norms based 
on an evolutionary genesis of norms  and  regulatory-ethical norms based on an elitist 
understanding of norms. The paper ends with a summary of my main findings.    
As stated in the introduction, three main groups of correlative arguments may be 
separated: arguments stemming from Catholic social teaching respectively Catholic social 
ethics, critique advanced by Haselbach and Ptak (i.e. authoritarian liberalism), and finally 
reasons advanced by representatives of the so called Foucault-  and Governmentality-
studies. In the following sub-sections I will briefly summarize the expressed objections 
dealing with current topics of economic ethics and I will also indirectly prepare for charging 
Ordoliberalism of elitism and expertocratic notion of science.       
                                                           
2 Cp. Renner 1999/2000. 
3 Cp. Wörsdörfer (forthcoming). Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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2.1. Catholic Social Teaching and Catholic Social Ethics 
The Roman-Catholic theologian, Oswald von Nell-Breuning
4 – mainly responsible for Pope 
Pius XI’s social encyclical Quadragesimo Anno (1931) – accuses Ordoliberalism for its 
formal and mainly negative definition of freedom and for not linking freedom with personal 
and ethical responsibility (Nell-Breuning 1954/1960: p. 91).
5  According to von Nell-
Breuning the adjective ‘social’ in the term Social Market Economy is just a ‘decorative fig 
leaf’ or ‘theoretical background music’ (1975/1990: p. 224 and p. 236; see also 
1956/1960). It is by no means sufficient to implement ex-post corrections in order to 
overcome structural, social deficits and mischief (1975/1990: pp. 227) or to try to reach 
social and ethical ideals as a mere by-product of economic policy. The state has to fulfil 
social-reforming and socio-political tasks –  an aspect that is in the eyes of von Nell-
Breuning completely lacking in the ordoliberal conception of the state focusing solely on 
economic-policy based on a fetishism of growth (p. 234). Von Nell-Breuning, therefore, 
concludes, that Ordoliberalism is merely advocating a ‘socially tempered capitalism’ (p. 
237) – to use a term introduced by Götz Briefs
6 – far from being a real paradigm shift. In a 
further step, von Nell-Breuning broadens his perspective and incorporates a general 
criticism of mainstream economics as well. In a paper dating from 1975, von Nell-Breuning 
states that economic theory of today with its paleo-liberal apology of market mechanism 
would lead to a depersonalization of each market participant, and to a depletion of human 
beings (1975: pp. 462). The hypostatization of the anonymous and abstract market and 
the one-dimensionality of the homo oeconomicus model incorporate a far reaching 
heteronomy of the individual (controlled by external forces) and an economic determinism 
in the way that each market participant just reacts on market signals like a programmed 
computer or an automatic machine. The human being is degraded and humiliated to a 
passive object of a nomological process which confuses competition as an  ordering 
instrument  with competition as an all-pervading and ubiquitous ordering principle.
7 
However, von Nell-Breuning admits that the position held by Franz Böhm and especially 
his concept of private autonomy
8
                                                           
4 Von Nell-Breuning’s essay from 1954/1960 is meaningful in at least one regard: here, von Nell-Breuning 
points at a fundamental weakness of Ordoliberalism, when he indicates that more and more socio-economic 
aspects are forced back into the so called Datenkranz by Ordoliberalism (p. 95), a set of data which cannot 
be directly influenced and which is exogenously fixed (cp. Eucken 1934: pp. 57; 1938a: p. 30).  
  is similar to the one of Catholic social ethics. He 
5 Cp. for an opposing view: Wörsdörfer 2010: pp. 25.  
6 See Briefs 1932/1980: p. 120.  
7  See Eucken 1948 as a direct reply to the objections raised by von Nell-Breuning; moreover, cp. the 
indicated literature of Rüstow and Röpke.   
8 Cp. Böhm 1966/1980. Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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concludes: on the assumption that Böhm represents ‘authentic Ordoliberalism’, a far-
reaching compatibility between Ordoliberalism and Catholic social ethics would exist.     
The second representative of Catholic social teaching worth mentioning is  even more 
radical than von Nell-Breuning.  Egon Edgar Nawroth, a Dominican priest, blames 
Ordoliberalism for its pre-established harmony respectively for its newly founded faith in 
harmony in the form of competitive order (Nawroth 1961/1962: p. 11). In addition, he 
criticizes the ordoliberal claim to absoluteness, its pseudo-theologian market 
fundamentalism, the individualistic concept of society, the notion of market obedience and 
submission (i.e. primacy of markets), the talking up of economics as transcendental 
metaphysics and the absolutization of markets (i.e. accusation of economism and 
Prinzipienmonismus; cp. pp. 12).
9  In the centre of his argument are the ordoliberal 
freedom pathos, the primacy of economic liberty and the notion of social justice merely 
reduced to a utilitarian-based and market-mechanical conception of justice (i.e. justice of 
market exchange; cp. pp. 130).
10
                                                           
9 Some of the objections raised against neoliberalism as a whole might be true – no doubt; yet, most of them 
can be rejected as related to German  Neoliberalism. E.g. Röpke pushes back against apologetic 
economization, economic imperialism, economic narrowing and against fetishism of growth (cp. Röpke 
1944/1949: pp. 385) and he explicitly refuses the model of homo oeconomicus (cp. Röpke 1955/1981: p. 
447) due to its mere material and egoistic profit seeking and its reductionism (i.e. reducing the complexity of 
human nature while ignoring the multiplicity of human motives of action; see for a similar estimation Rüstow 
1957: S. 63, where he (indirectly) argues against pleonexia and chrematistics, and Eucken 1934: pp. 21 
(critique of the homo oeconomicus model); 1938b: p. 81 (criticism of absolutization of economics and 
economic totality):  In total, Eucken rejects both economic imperialism, economists’ ignorance and 
interdisciplinary separation; he opposes a neo-classical, game theoretical, transaction cost analysis image of 
humanity picturing man as an individualised brute utility maximiser. Moreover,  he rejects un-tempered 
capitalism without checks and balances, he regards economic growth not as a target per se, and he argues 
against the glorification of individualism, egoism and materialism. The pursuit of self-interest should only be 
achieved within specific legal, political and moral boundaries (cp. Dietze/Eucken/Lampe 1941/1942: p. 32)). 
Finally,  Böhm (1937), a further member of the Freiburg School, condemns materialistic individualism, 
reckless profit-seeking, the glorification of economic egoism and the dog-eat-dog-society. As a result, this 
exploitative and anarchic bellum omnium contra omnes leads directly towards the state of massification and 
a decline in values in general and a decline of public spiritedness in particular. In total, the homo 
oeconomicus model is far from being the dominant ordoliberal disposition of individuality.  
 ‘Social ethics’ is thus nothing but an equivalent of a 
competitive-conform ‘functional (pseudo) ethics’ (Funktionalethik): justice criteria are 
subject to market-theoretical criteria and commutative justice is defined mainly in negative 
terms enabling and fostering market processes. A further point of criticism is the 
dominance of the principle of competition, the ‘mythical and ideological absolutization of 
competitive automatisms’ (pp. 141), which leads to a far-reaching neglect of the necessity 
of an ethically embedded and socio-ethically shaped societal structure (i.e. soziale 
Durchformung). Finally, Nawroth criticizes the idea of man proposed by Ordoliberalism 
(pp. 246): in the eyes of Nawroth and others, the ordoliberal idea of man rests upon 
10 See Wörsdörfer 2010 and the chapter Von Hayek and Ordoliberalism on Justice in my PhD thesis for an 
opposing interpretation of the ordoliberal understanding of liberty and justice.  Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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individualism and atomism. Society is just the aggregate of several free, autonomous and 
self-interested individuals cooperating solely for the single purpose of realizing mutual 
benefits.
11  Thus, (Böhm’s private law) society is no better than a special purpose 
association (i.e. Zweckverbund). In total, German Neoliberalism with its utopian, mythical 
and hypothetical liberalism substitutes the jusnaturalistic-deistic liberalism of English-
Scottish enlightenment; it is but the renaissance of Paleoliberalism.
12  Furthermore, the 
apologetic character of Ordoliberalism functioning as secularized doctrine of salvation is 
just an ideology defending the rights of rent-seekers and the (plutocratic) ruling class 
(Interessentenideologie) (pp. 392-425).
13  A few years after his dissertation, Nawroth 
published another work on Ordoliberalism (Nawroth 1965), in which he summarises, 
condenses and popularises the main allegations against Ordoliberalism: e.g. over-
emphasis of market and exchange mechanisms, priority of the logic of markets, 
subordination to the inherent necessities and factual constraints of the market 
(Sachzwänge), mythical personification and absolutization of markets, belief in the 
(superhuman) rationality of the invisible hand, disregard of the relativity and of the limits of 
the ‘laws’ of market processes, favouritism of an ethically indifferent and socially blind 
automatism, idea of competition as a universal and everlasting natural order.
14
To sum up the differences between Catholic social ethics and Ordoliberalism, we can draw 
on a paper recently published by Bernhard Emunds (2010: pp. 5)
               
15
                                                           
11 See Emunds 2010. 
, director of the Nell-
Breuning Institute:  the first subtle distinction concerns the anthropological fundament: 
Catholicism disapproves the ordoliberal idea of man which seems at first sight to rest upon 
atomism and individualism. Additionally, Ordoliberalism is accused of materialism and 
consumerism. Contrary to the (supposed) ordoliberal one-sided idea of man – i.e. biased 
and economized presentation of the idea of man focusing solely on the individual nature 
while neglecting man as a social being –, Catholic social ethics defines the individual as a 
social being, a zoon politikon, with its ability to communicate and cooperate within a 
community and to declare one’s solidarity with others; secondly, according to Catholic 
social teaching, the economy is more than sheer market exchange (i.e. the market as a 
12 Cp. the contrary-minded theses of Rüstow in: Rüstow 1961 and 1945/2001.  
13 This is a complete misrepresentation and distortion of facts of one of the core criteria of Ordoliberalism.  
14  Ptak speaks in this regard of  a quasi-religious outline of the natural order (Ptak 2007: p. 29); see 
Klump/Wörsdörfer 2009; Wörsdörfer 2010 and Wörsdörfer (forthcoming): chapter 2.2 dealing with these 
kinds of accusations in more detail.   
15 Emunds is absolutely right in his critique, when he refers to the reception or adoption of Ordoliberalism by 
mainstream economists (cp. the work of Homann (Homann/Blome-Drees 1992; Homann/Lütge 2004/2005); 
Starbatty (1994; 1997) et al. referring and citing mainly the alleged major works of Ordoliberalism); however, 
his critical review is not entirely correct when applied to the primary literature of the main representatives of 
Ordoliberalism.  Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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subsystem is only a partial coordination instrument), and society consists of more than just 
the economy – thus, referring to the social embeddedness of the economic sphere.
16 In 
this context, Ordoliberalism is accused of postulating a reductionism of society to economy 
and of reducing economy to market processes. Thirdly and finally, the topic of 
Berufsständische Ordnung (i.e. a socio-economic order mainly consisting of occupational 
groupings  –  so called Ordines  –  with an emphasis on subsidiarity
17), causes some 
indignation  –  this time on the part of Ordoliberalism. The ‘professional order’ was 
postulated by Catholic social ethics as the ideal type of order, but completely rejected by 
the main proponents of Ordoliberalism supporting the competitive order.
18
Besides the divergences between Catholic social ethics and Ordoliberalism, the parallels 
should not go unmentioned: both kinds of ethics (endeavour to) combine the principle of 
subsidiarity and the principle of solidarity, they are both among the normative foundations 
of Social Market Economy –  albeit with diverging priorities –, and both ethics are 
religiously grounded and rest upon transcendental values.
  
19
2.2. Michel Foucault and Governmentality Studies
 
20
According to Michel Foucault, Ordoliberalism rests on two pillars: the ‘society for the 
market’ and the ‘society against the market’ column (Foucault 2006: p. 335). The ‘society 
for the market’ pillar  can be paraphrased with the key words ‘business or corporation 
society’ (Unternehmensgesellschaft  (p. 208)) and ‘competitive market economy’ 
(Wettbewerbsmarktwirtschaft  (p. 248)). The society is shaped by the model of 
entrepreneurship; competition and the homo oeconomicus model are the ordering 
rationales, and the laws of the market serve as the principles of societal regulation. Further 
key words relating to this pillar are: the market as the place of the establishment of truth 
(Markt als Ort der Wahrheitsfindung  (pp. 55)), economic legitimacy of the state (i.e. 




                                                           
16 Cp. the indicated literature of Rüstow and Röpke at the end of this paper, emphasizing the significance of 
embedding the economy in a broader socio-cultural framework (especially Röpke 1958/1961). See also 
Eucken 1926: p. 16, where he aims at implementing an “all-encompassing spiritual or intellectual order” 
(“umfassende(n) geistige(n) Lebensordnung”).  
  The  ‘society against the market’ pillar  contains one of the central 
concepts within Ordoliberalism: Vitalpolitik  (Vital Policy). According to Foucault, this 
component of Ordoliberalism offers compensation regarding the cold-hearted, rigorous 
17 See Höffner (a doctoral student of Eucken) 1959/2006: p. 194 and Messner 1936. 
18 E.g. Eucken 1952/2004: pp. 145 and p. 348.  
19 Cp. Wörsdörfer (forthcoming).  
20 Cp. for a critical-constructive assessment of Foucault’s analysis: Wörsdörfer (forthcoming).  
21  Cp.  Ptak 2007: pp. 23, who speaks of a legitimacy of the total market society (totale/entgrenzte 
Marktgesellschaft) as one of the key elements of Ordoliberalism.  Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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and severe (competitive) market apparatus. The market-free sectors  –  as one integral 
component of that pillar – function as an anti-thetical counterweight: They supply the need 
for social integration and restore cultural and moral values.   
Subsequent to Foucault, several spokespersons of the so called Foucault-  and 
Governmentality studies are making serious allegations against neoliberalism in general – 
without distinguishing between the diverse factions inside the neoliberal movement. The 
main accusations concern the all-pervading  economization  of society (i.e. “… self-
sufficiency and autonomy of economic rationality, which is forced upon us by the inherent 
logic of the market. They argue in a reductionist and deterministic fashion for a ‘pure’ and 
‘value-free’ economics which has no place in its axiomatics for ethical categories”
22), 
economic imperialism
23  and the homo oeconomicus  model.
24  According to the 
neoliberalism-definition of O‘Malley (2009: 3) et al., neoliberalism consists of the advocacy 
of the market (i.e. markets as autonomous spheres applying to their own rules), the 
promotion of business-like relations and market governance, the economization of formerly 
non-economic spheres (i.e. commodification and implementation of market-like, self-
regulating forms of governance), the universalization of market-based social relations, the 
reaffirmation of individual responsibility (i.e. empowering  in a risk-based society), 
economized language, the differentiation between Government and Governance (i.e. less 
government, but not less (market) governance) and finally the entrepreneur as the neo-
liberal hero (i.e. rational choice actor, homo oeconomicus and the individual equipped with 
specific resources investing in the competencies of the entrepreneurial self and its 
employability).
25
2.3. Authoritarian Liberalism 
 
Ordoliberalism as the butt of calumny? Dieter Haselbach  (1991) and Ralf Ptak  (2004; 
2007) are both emphasizing the (alleged) ordoliberal critique of parliamentary democracy 
and its antagonism and rivalry with the Weimar Republic in particular.
26
                                                           
22 Fearns, James in: Ulrich 2008: p. xiii; cp. Ptak 2007: p. 14. 
 As a proof they are 
23 See Ptak 2007: p. 30; 2004: pp. 156 (i.e. all-encompassing socio-political validity claim) and Candeias 
2003/2009: pp. 101 (i.e. neoliberalism as a hegemonic project). 
24 Cp. for a contrary view within German Neoliberalism: Röpke 1944/1949: pp. 385; 1955/1981: p. 447. 
25 Cp. Lemke 2000; Shamir 2008; Ptak 2007: p. 30 (i.e. analysis of politics as a quasi-market-relationship); 
Larner 2000; Heidenreich 2010 and for a dissimilar review of Ordoliberalism, falsifying most of the forwarded 
objections with regard to German Neoliberalism, the indicated literature of Klump and Wörsdörfer.  
26 According to Ptak, it was one of the central aims of Ordoliberalism to destroy the Weimar Republic and its 
constitution and to pave the way for National Socialism (Ptak 2004: p. 43; 2007: p. 19). In order to refute this 
unfounded accusation, the reader should just take a peek at Eucken’s controversy with Heidegger’s attempt 
to implement the Führerprinzip  at the University of Freiburg, at Eucken’s activity within the Freiburg 
resistance circles and at Eucken’s lecture  Kampf der Wissenschaft.  Furthermore, he should consider 
Röpke’s appeal Ein Sohn Niedersachsens an das Landvolk dating from September 11, 1930(!): “No one, Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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referring to (neo-)conservatives like Carl Schmitt
27, a German jurist, political theorist and 
professor of law who coined the term ‘Strong State’ – a phrase often used by ordoliberal 
thinkers like Eucken and Rüstow (albeit within a different context and with a dissimilar 
connotation
28). Furthermore, Haselbach and Ptak are querying whether the 
representatives of the Freiburg School and other thinkers (vaguely) affiliated to 
Ordoliberalism, like Müller-Armack and Erhard, were really part of the resistance 
movement against National Socialism. According to Haselbach (and Ptak), Ordoliberalism 
over-emphasizes the strong state with its nearly dictatorial plentitude of power as one way 
of removing the weak interventionist state; it reportedly takes side of an authoritarian style 
of politics, of a dictatorial state order and it represents a comprehensive hostility towards 
(democratic) pluralism. Its ‘primacy of politics’ (Haselbach 1991: p. 38) becomes clear 
taking the ‘longing for autocratic leadership’ (p. 42) and the romantic-conservative or 
idealistic-communitarian cultural and social criticism of Ordoliberalism into account.
29
Reply and dismissal  of the baseless allegations presented by Haselbach and Ptak: 
Haselbach and Ptak are absolutely right when they are pointing at the fact that several 
ordoliberal thinkers acted as advisors and consultants during  the Nazi era (i.e. 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Volkswirtschaftslehre  (Working Group on Economics) of the 
      
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
electing the National Socialists on September 14, should later on claim that he did not know what might 
happen. He should know that he will elect chaos instead of order, destruction instead of construction. He 
should know that he votes for war within and outside the country, for senseless destruction …” (my 
translation of Röpke 1930/1965: p. 167); see also Röpke’s speech Epochenwende?, dating from February 8, 
1933, one week after(!) Hitler’s seizure of power (Röpke 1933/1965: pp. 167).  
Yet, it should also be noted, that Eucken and others were indeed sceptical of (unlimited) parliamentary 
democracy – although they were supporting the rule of law (i.e. separation of powers, fundamental rights 
charter, protection against arbitrariness; see Eucken 1952/2004: pp. 48) – due to the fact that parliamentary 
decision making processes are subject to the influence of socio-political pressure groups (i.e. rent seeking 
and power groups) (cp. Eucken 1932b: S. 307; 1948: pp. 68). They were uneasy about democracy regarding 
the influence of masses in combination with the impact of interest groups as dangerous – pointing once 
again to the at least ambivalent and reserved attitude towards democracy and masses. The Ordoliberals saw 
the Weimar Republic as a weak and party- and pressure group-dominated corporate state (Verbändestaat). 
E.g. Miksch is quite sceptical and doubtful whether the democratic state is able to withstand the pressure of 
lobbying groups (cp. Miksch 1937/1947: p. 217). Moreover, the Ordoliberals evidently opposed unlimited 
government and the rent-seeking society and they sought to implement institutional precautions in order to 
prevent the backfall into a state of re-feudalisation and collusion of private and public power in cartel-like 
corporatist arrangements in which the state authorities are captured by vested interests.       
27 Cp. for Eucken’s alleged affinity to Carl Schmitt: Tribe 1995: p. 212. 
28 Cp. Eucken 1932b: p. 307; see for Eucken’s anti-totalitarian stance: Eucken 1932a: pp. 85; 1948: pp. 74; 
cp. also Roser 1998: pp. 250 and p. 327; Böhm 1946/1996: pp. 311-318 for information about his critique of 
belief in authority (Obrigkeitsgläubigkeit) and idolization of power and for criticizing Schmitt for his 
authoritarian, totalitarian and despotic ideology.   
The overall aim of the ‘strong state’ standing above power groups is to defend general public  interests 
against particular interests. In order to reach this goal, public institutions require a certain amount of authority 
to exert power – yet, in a constitutional and rule-of-law framework with its checks and balances. In total, the 
strong state is no benevolent dictator or a totalitarian leviathan.  
29 According to Haselbach (1991: p. 110) and Ptak (2004: pp. 190), the ordoliberal Wertkonservatismus is 
anti-modernistic and cultural-pessimistic per se (i.e. romantic anti-liberal clothing and re-establishment of a 
strong small craftsman and peasant society). Ptak even speaks in this context of a metaphysical pseudo-
integration and of an idealization of the medieval societal structures (Ptak 2004: p. 192 and p. 200).  Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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Akademie für deutsches Recht (Academy for German Law/AfDR) primarily working on a 
post-war socio-economic order). Nonetheless, the ordoliberal scientists did not collaborate 
with the Nazi-regime prior and during wartime (the AfDR was later on, in March 1943, 
dissolved; yet, the work continued within the de facto resistance circle Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
Erwin von Beckerath). Once more it seems by far exaggerated to claim that Ordoliberals 
functioned as pragmatic and opportunistic experts of the Nazi-institutions (Haselbach 
1991: p. 99; Ptak 2004: p. 139). To the contrary, the ordoliberal academics were highly 
critical of National Socialism at least  when we read between the lines. In sum, the 
ordoliberal refereeing was not directly targeted at the Nazi institutions; rather, its primary 
aim was post-war planning and it contained a coded and severe critique of wartime 
economic policy!   
Haselbach and Ptak are also right when they purport that Eucken’s ‘Grundlagen’-book was 
among the basis of discussion of one of the first meetings of the AfDR (which contained by 
the way many resistance fighters of the Freiburg circles) and that Müller-Armack
30
In sum, the conclusion drawn by Haselbach and especially Ptak that the ‘myth’ or ‘fairy-
tale’ of the alleged resistance fighters is a good example of apologetic creation of legends 
(Ptak 2004: p. 63) has to be repudiated. Haselbach even speaks of a ‘belatedly self-
fashioning’ of ordoliberal scientists as NS-oppositionists and freedom fighters (Haselbach 
1991: pp. 94). 
  – 
although he is not a member of the definition of Ordoliberalism underlying this paper – and 
Fritz W. Meyer, as a Eucken-disciple, were members of the NSDAP. But they are totally 
misled when they are writing that a wide-spread compatibility and intersection existed 
between the economic-ethical program of Ordoliberalism gathering around the normative 
values individual liberty, social justice and human dignity on the one hand and the racist 
and totalitarian ideology of National Socialism on the other hand. This is an entire 
misinterpretation of the economical and ethical aims of the founders of the ordoliberal 
‘competitive order’.       
Yet, utterly unconsidered are the so called Freiburg Circles, the Diehl-seminar, the essay 
Wirtschafts-  und Sozialordnung  (Economic and Social Order) written by von Dietze, 
Eucken and Lampe, the so called Volkswirtschaftsfibel  and its vehement critique of 
National Socialism, Eucken’s friendship to Husserl, Eucken’s debate with Großmann-
Doerth about anti-Semitism and the subsequent abandonment of friendship, the 
                                                           
30 Cp. for more information about Müller-Armack and National Socialism and about his work Staatsidee und 
Wirtschaftsordnung im neuen Reich: Dietzfelbinger 1998: pp. 36 and Oswalt 2001; see for a similar critique 
on Erhard’s work Kriegsfinanzierung und Schuldenkonsolidierung: Oswalt 2001 and Ptak 2004: pp. 145. Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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controversies surrounding the Heidegger rectorship at Freiburg University, the trial against 
Böhm because of his lack of national-socialist weltanschauung, etc.
31
Besides mentioning the authoritarian and dogmatic characteristics of Ordoliberalism
 In addition, Ptak and 
Haselbach are not differentiating between the diverse representatives of the dissimilar 
economic-ethical schools. Nevertheless, Haselbach and especially Ptak are of eminent 
significance with regard to the elitism-critique corroborated in this essay. That is the 
reason for incorporating their interpretations of Ordoliberalism. 
32, 
Ptak (2004 and 2007) brings up further (suspected) features of Ordoliberalism: first of all, 
its putative anti-egalitarianism and its social Darwinism, and secondly, its possible 
ideologisation. The thesis that Ordoliberalism pursues a social Darwinistic order is often 
demonstrated with some of the titles of ‘ordoliberal’ publications like the following one 
edited by Günter Schmölders
33:  Der Wettbewerb als Mittel volkswirtschaftlicher 
Leistungssteigerung und Leistungsauslese (competition as a means to increase economic 
efficiency and as a means to economic selection)
34 (Ptak 2004: pp. 292; 2007: p. 73). As 
we will see in chapter 3, Ordoliberalism indeed stresses the principle of efficiency, 
incentive wages and payment by results and achievement. And they are undeniably 
making use of the term ‘selection’ or ‘Auslese’ (cp. Eucken 1942: p. 39; 1944: pp. 200; 
1953: p. 16
35
                                                           
31 Cp. Dietze/Eucken/Lampe 1941/1942; 1943/2008; Blumenberg-Lampe 1973; In der Stunde Null 1979; 
Roser 1998: pp. 111; Goldschmidt 2002: pp. 117; Oswalt 2005. 
)  –  however, without social-Darwinistic connotations. To the contrary, the 
terms are applied to a situation describing an economic contest with different competitors 
equipped with equal(!) socio-economic power offering highly innovative products and 
competing for the favour of consumers. This economic race takes place under equal 
starting conditions(!) guaranteed and monitored by the state as an impartial(!) referee and 
neutral arbitrator. At the end, the entrepreneur wins who has mostly satisfied the needs of 
consumers (i.e. competition on the merits and in terms of better services to consumers). 
Thus, the focus on Leistungskonkurrenz (competition in efficiency) or Leistungsprinzip is 
32 See Candeias 2003/2009: pp. 413: Like Ptak and Haselbach, Candeias takes a similar view that (German) 
Neoliberalism consist of a conservative-authoritarian idea of man and society. Furthermore, he states that an 
ideological proximity exists between orthodox neoliberalism and neo-fascism and between neoliberalism and 
cesarism (as opposed to this cp. Röpke’s critique of Caesaro-economism in: Röpke 1965: pp. 48). According 
to Candeias, neoliberalism (paradoxically) requires a strong, sometimes repressive, and at the same times a 
lean and non-intervening minimal government or night-watchman state (cp. Ptak 2007: p. 63). See for more 
information about the putative authoritarian roots of neoliberalism and the neoliberal security state: Candeias 
2003/2009: pp. 429. 
33 Although Schmölders was not a member of Ordoliberalism, the mentioned book edited by him contains 
essays by Böhm, Eucken and Miksch, the core members of Ordoliberalism in the narrow sense. 
34 See also Eucken 1953: p. 16 stressing the significance of competition as a tool of selection.  
35  Böhm even distinguishes between a domination-free  Kampfordnung  based on Auslesekampf and 
Leistungsprinzip and a centrally planned Friedensordnung  based on Nicht-Leistungswettbewerb and 
Monopolkampf; cp. Böhm 1933/1964. Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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not to be confused with social Darwinism, social selection or a reckless disregard of the 
worst-off in a society (cp. Rüstow 1957: p. 20 where he criticises vulgar-Darwinist 
evolutionism). After all, the ideal socio-economic order imagined by Ordoliberalism is not 
simply a functioning and efficient one; it is at the same time a humane one which provides 
human dignity and social justice.
36
The topic of ideologisation presented by Ptak refers to the establishment of an ‘ideological 
phalanx’ against collectivism (i.e. economic democracy/Wirtschaftsdemokratie, economic 
steering and planning, Keynesian policy of full employment) established by the ‘sect’ 
neoliberalism (Ptak 2007: p. 27). This involves a pointed emphasis or an aggravation of its 
own model and a systematic and aggressive campaign of discrimination against all other 
oppositional socio-economic theories (i.e. anti-socialist and anti-capitalist propaganda, 
deliberate construction of anti-poles and friend-foe-thinking; see Ptak 2004: pp. 156; 2007: 
p. 24
       
37). In order to reach such an ideological phalanx, an ideological bond was needed. 
Therefore, many Ordoliberals instrumentally use a mythical recourse to the occidental (i.e. 
antique and Judeo-Christian) tradition of values (p. 42). Additionally, a good publicity was 
needed in order to win the fight for cultural and socio-economic hegemony. The ideological 
embeddedness of the ordoliberal concept was found in the model of Social Market 
Economy as a Third Way between socialism and collectivism on the one hand and laissez 
faire Manchester-capitalism on the other hand (pp. 156).
38
3. Ordoliberalism and Science as an Ordering Power 
 I will come back to Ptak’s in a 
certain way legitimate point of ideologisation as one major step of implementing 
Ordoliberalism in chapter 3.5.   
Most of the just mentioned accusations can be refuted by referring to the primary literature 
of Rüstow, Röpke, Eucken and others. Yet, there is one point of criticism missing 
respectively one point which has received surprisingly little attention. Ptak, Fischer et al. 
are mentioning this kind of argument en passant. Fischer e.g. writes: “Eucken instead 
looks for the independent, expert and intellectual instance [or authority] that has gained 
valuable insights into the overall economic problem of steering and managing, that has 
                                                           
36  Cp. Wörsdörfer (forthcoming): chapter 2.2 explaining the essence of markets and competition as 
instruments of disempowerment, of promoting the overall wealth of a society, of increasing the level of liberty 
and thus, of ensuring human dignity.   
37 Ptak even states that the whole concept of Ordoliberalism is just a negative one building up fronting 
positions: against dirigisme, interventionism, collectivism, the modern welfare state, centrally planned 
economy, democracy and social justice (Ptak 2007: p. 50). 
38 This is an excellent example of not distinguishing between the model of Social Market Economy, the 
conception of Müller-Armack and the notion of state and economy favored by the Freiburg School and 
Ordoliberalism – although several differences exist particularly in the context of social as well as business 
cycle policy (cp. Blum 1969: pp. 116; Quaas 2000: pp. 254 and Ulrich 1997/2008: pp. 369).   Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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acquired knowledge of the objective needs of socio-economic interdependencies and that 
can thus make use of his or her authoritarian certainty. With due regard to this requirement 
profile, the number of conceivable elitist ordering potencies is reduced to just one: none 
but the reasoning of ‘men of science’ with its ‘rigorous theoretical-economical training’, 
which cannot satisfactorily be shown by laymen and ideologists, comes basically into 
question as an ordering power. […] Science in the manner of Eucken is that [anti-
democratic] authority, which is not only in the possession of theoretical truth, but also in 
the possession of practical-political truth. This possession of truth makes science the one 
and only approved vital power in the rank of a formative and constituting power [i.e. 
exclusive ordering function of science]” (my translation of Fischer 1993: pp. 146; emphasis 
added by M.W.). 
In this paper, I would like to sustain and corroborate this verdict (i.e. accusation of an 
elitist-hierarchical thinking and claims of objectivity and absoluteness). I will pursue this 
lead by analyzing the primary literature of the main representatives of Ordoliberalism in the 
strict and wider sense, namely Alexander Rüstow, Wilhelm Röpke and Walter Eucken. 
Eucken is in this regard of special importance, because his pursuit of absolute truth 
reminds the reader of the work of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and Rudolf Eucken’s 
‘realm of truth’ (Reich der Wahrheit) – thus, this paper closes the circle of my PhD thesis 
by linking the last to  the first paper on the affiliation of Ordoliberalism and 
phenomenology.
39




                                                           
39 See Klump/Wörsdörfer 2010.  
: the differentiation between these kinds of ethics allows for a further segregation 
with regards to the formation of norms: individual ethics with its Christian foundation of 
values and its liberal-Kantian heritage refers to the evolutionary genesis of norms (and 
bearing resemblances to von Hayek’s conception of Cultural Evolution and Spontaneous 
Order), while regulatory ethics refers to the ordoliberal realm of truth and, consequently, to 
an elitist genesis of norms. 
40 Cp. Wörsdörfer (forthcoming). Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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3.1. Performance-oriented and Elite-Hierarchy
41
Already in his work Civitas Humana – the first edition dating from 1944 – Röpke mentions 
the eminent significance of leadership and guidance (Röpke 1944/1949: p. 17; see Eucken 
1953: p. 24). According to Röpke, leadership restricted to a(n elitist) minority
 
42 or ruling 
class (Röpke 1944/1949: p. 210) is necessary – otherwise the decay and disintegration of 
the occidental society, of the real community, will occur (p. 339); the hierarchical nature of 
society belongs to its essence. Each attempt to level and flatten the societal hierarchy will 
lead to chaos and anarchy (i.e. intellectual massification as a major component of the 
societal crisis of the present) and to a devoid of relationship. Therefore, Röpke’s ideal-
typical society is structured and arranged in a pyramid-like and hierarchical manner (p. 
245). However, although the hierarchical and non-egalitarian nature belongs to the core of 
each society
43
                                                           
41 It is remarkable that – although the Ordoliberals are not quite often referring explicitly to the term ‘elite’ 
(elite simply means elected, selecting or chosen (lat.: exlegere/electus; fr.: élire); cp. Röpke 1963/1965: pp. 
217) – they refuse elites qua birth, social origin/background and descent (often accompanied by inherited 
richness). This kind of Herkunftselite associated with feudal aristocracy, bourgeoisie or oligarchy and all their 
exclusive privileges and prerogatives is totally condemned by Ordoliberalism. Another type of elite –  so 
called  Machtelite/power elite –  is disapproved as well. Yet, Ordoliberalism favors a different 
terminology/concept of elite –  namely the so called Leistungs-  and Wertelite  (elite based on individual 
achievements, qualifications and/or special habitus (canon of values) characterized by distinguished moral-
ethical qualities) or the Positions-  and  Funktionselite  (e.g. achievement-dependent economic, political, 
administrative, jurisprudential, and scientific/expert elite). The focus of Ordoliberalism is on the education 
elite; scientific experts –  as seen by Ordoliberalism –  are one central part of the societal elite. The 
meritocratic principle of achievement and performance (Leistungsprinzip) is highlighted by several 
Ordoliberals on different occasions. The selection of elites is primarily based on individual merits and 
qualifications (performance as selection criterion); the elite is composed of key personnel of a society 
(Leistungsträger). Society consists of a (heterogenic) plurality of Teileliten (sectoral elites) depicting the 
functional social differentiation. What is essentially important from an ordoliberal perspective is that the elitist 
position is not dependent on (educational) privileges, exclusive and network-dependent access to class-
specific institutions (societal segregation, distinction, exclusion and closure) and/or (socio-economic) power. 
They are pleading for equal opportunities for advancement and upward mobility as one major precondition 
for recruiting the ‘strategic elites’. Additionally, the Ordoliberals are adopting the common distinction between 
elites (as the ruling class) and masses respectively the mass society (cp. the ordoliberal topic of 
Gesellschaftskrisis). Rüstow, Röpke, Eucken et al. fear the ruling of uncivilized masses; thus, they fight the 
process of massification. The uneducated ‘mob’ requires leaders (masses vs. leaders) which are 
(presumably) intellectual superior. The Ordoliberals are convinced that societal leadership is indispensable 
and that some people (as an elitist minority) are predestined for leading and guiding the majority of the 
population (i.e. ordoliberal scientific experts as part of the elite are ideally in charge of fulfilling this task). 
Inseparably connected with the distinction between masses (=lower classes) and elites (=upper classes) is 
the criticism of parliamentarism, democracy and pluralism. The ruling of masses – in combination with the 
impact of interest groups – has to be prevented by all means. Moreover, Ordoliberalism not only emphasizes 
the dynamic and meritocratic elements concerning the circulation of elites/the social advancement and 
decline, they highlight the eminent importance of elites concerning the genesis of norms and the formal as 
well as informal institutional change (cp. for more information about the sociology of elites: Hartmann 
2004/2008).         
, Röpke distinguishes between a hierarchy based on privileges and (an 
42 Röpke refers often to the elitist nature of so called Stammfamilien (Röpke 1944/1949: p. 211), families 
which are part of the elitist hierarchy based on individual performance; Böhm (1937: p. 118) even claims that 
certain social classes were born to rule and that they were destined for leadership.  
43  See for further information: Rüstow’s Ortsbestimmung der Gegenwart  (Determination of the Present’s 
Location), his essay Wirtschaftsethische Probleme der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft (Economic-ethical Problems Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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elitist) hierarchy based on performance (and virtue
44) (i.e. Confucian-like leading by 
example
45; p. 339). Röpke leaves no doubt about his preferences: like Rüstow and 
Eucken, he prefers a performance-based hierarchy or in Röpke’s terminology: a Leistungs- 
and Elitehierarchie (societal hierarchy based on performance and elitist expertocracy; p. 
211)! Thus, the ordoliberal elitism and societal hierarchy is highly related to special 
intellectual and mental capabilities or skills. All this goes along with a high degree of faith 
and trust in elite and experts. The ideal state is in a certain way a corporative system, a 
Ständestaat, yet, with pervious class barriers and what is equally vital: it is not simply a 
meritocracy
46
3.2. Meritocracy: The Special Role of Performance Capability 
; rather, it is an expertocracy as well! Each person is able to climb up the 
social ladder according to individual capabilities, achievements, performances  and 
personal merits and the just described making up of intellectual  elite is guiding and 
directing society. 
The principle of performance capability (i.e. Leistungsfähigkeitsprinzip
47
The ideal society of Ordoliberalism is based on the meritocratic principle: every man is the 
architect of his fortune and fortune favours the brave – to use two well-known sayings. 
Each person should be able to socially ascend according to his or her (physical and) 
intellectual competencies and skill
) is omnipresent in 
the writings of Ordoliberalism. It shapes the notion of justice, the concept of competitive 
order and the social policy recommendations based on the ordoliberal diagnosis of the 
present.  
48
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
of the Social Market Economy (1955)) and Röpke’s Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart (The Social Crisis of 
Our Time (1942)). 
 and should be rewarded according to one’s merits. 
Social climbing and upward mobility has to be allowed for and facilitated by making the 
socio-economic structures more transparent and more achievement-oriented. In addition, 
the public authorities are responsible for guaranteeing justice of the starting conditions 
44 According to Röpke (1963/1965: p. 216), intellectual skills form a unified whole with exemplary character 
traits and virtues.   
45 See the indicated literature about meritocratic and expertocratic elitism inside Confucianism in: Wörsdörfer 
2007. 
46 Röpke states a natural hierarchy of performances and functions. Such a societal structure is necessary in 
order to prevent intellectual massification and the flattening of the pyramid of ranks. 
47 Cp. Rüstow 1950; Röpke 1950: i.e. social advancement of the diligent persons and social decline of the 
non-diligent ones; cp. Lenel/Meyer 1948: p. IX: “Competition does not tolerate the conservation and 
preservation of social classes. It is the order of social advancement and decline depending on the principle 
of pure performance” (my translation); see also Böhm 1933/1964: pp. 273 (i.e. meritocratic competitive order 
as the principle of individual justice).  
48 Though, Ordoliberalism incorporates physical gifts and talents into its analysis as well, a clear favouritism 
or bias towards intellectual skills is more than obvious.  Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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(equality at the start of life or justice at the start: Startgerechtigkeit)
49
Equal opportunities and justice of the starting conditions are two central requirements of 
the principle of performance capability. To facilitate the implementation of this principle it is 
necessary to abolish the ‘aristocratic’ nobility by birth and the ‘feudal’ law of inheritance 
which is responsible for inherited inequalities (Rüstow 2001: pp. 83). Here, Rüstow pleads 
for progressive death duties so to overcome the current plutocracy.   
, i.e. just and equal 
opportunities with regard to education, training and qualification (Rüstow 2001: pp. 83). 
Education should not depend on the social background or the financial means of a person; 
rather, what matters are the individual talents and gifts as well as the willingness and the 
proof to work hard (Rüstow 2001: pp. 83). The education policy, therefore, has to provide 
scholar- and fellowships for promising and auspicious pupils and students.   
Additionally, the principle of performance capability may also be found in the context of 
economic policy: the conception of competitive order rests upon the distinction between 
Leistungs- (competition through achievement or competition in terms of better services to 
consumers) and Behinderungs-  or  Vernichtungswettbewerb  (‘competition’ based on 
market powers instead of performance
50
3.3. ‘Expertocracy’: The Special Role of Clercs 
 and aiming at the restriction and hindrance of 
(further increasing) competition/’competition’ to prevent competition). The Ordoliberals 
speak in this context of Leistungskonkurrenz which has to be established. 
Leistungskonkurrenz and Leistungswettbewerb assure a just income and assets 
distribution according to individual efforts and achievements. Additionally, justice consists 
of the equivalence of performance and counter-performance (i.e. principle of equivalence) 
(see Rüstow 1950).    
In  Civitas Humana, Röpke mentions the importance of special countervailing powers, 
acting as a counterbalance to public authorities –  a concept quite similar to Eucken’s 
ordering potencies developed in his Grundsätze-book: in line with Eucken, Röpke includes 
science respectively academics at the forefront. Moreover, Röpke mentions judges and 
journalists as other countervailing powers. Journalists, judges and scientists are subsumed 
                                                           
49  The principle of equality of opportunities and of the starting conditions has not to be confused  with 
egalitarianism. All ordoliberal thinkers are highly critical of egalitarianism which seems to be interlinked with 
von Mises’ ‘spiral of interventions’ (e.g. Mises 1926/1981) and the modern welfare state (cp. Röpke’s critique 
of the welfare state in: 1933/1965: p. 175; 1942: p. 261 and p. 271; 1944/1949: pp. 171 and pp. 255; 
1958/1961: p. 75, pp. 226 and p. 244.; see also Röpke 1950: pp. 65ff., where he pleads against absolute 
material equality of the living conditions. Equality of opportunity is just a relative principle and it has to be 
commensurable with the ethical ideal of liberty.    
50 Entrepreneurial freedom is only legitimately justifiable when it is based on market performance and not on 
market powers (see Erhard/Müller-Armack 1972: p. 222). Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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under the term clerc. Clercs are not part of a separate institution or profession; the term 
rather refers to a special kind of people and to a unique attitude of mind and in thinking. 
The characteristics of clercs are: sense of responsibility and justice, pursuit of truth, and 
steeliness. They (have to) serve the uncorrupted truth and the values which are 
supranational and antecedent of the state. Remarkable is the fact that many clercs are 
part of the middle classes (equally apart from proletarianisation and corrupting opulence 
and prosperity; a certain degree of material independency is necessary). Some clercs are 
even part of a religious community (i.e. clergyman) – religion
51
As already stated, the major groups within the clercs are scientists, judges and journalist. 
1. Scientists and scholars function as an independent authority of society just as judges 
and journalists. They have to represent the truth; they are obliged to genuine truth – even 
though verity might conflict with state doctrines. Should it be necessary, the scientist as a 
‘secularized clergy’ has to swim against the tide; he has to be intellectually independent of 
prevailing opinions (see also Böhm/Eucken/Großmann-Doerth 1936/2008: p. 27: “men of 
science are the only objective, independent advisor due to its position standing above 
economic interests”). Their task is to banish ideologies and unjustified prejudices as well 
as the disclosure and critical evaluation of pseudo-scientific value-judgments.
, therefore, serves as a 
further countervailing power and as a constitutive force of the economic, political and 
social order as well (cp. Eucken 1952/2004).               
52 But what is 
most important is the fight against relativism of values and the defence of binding core 
ethical values like trueness, justice, peace and community (Röpke 1944/1949: p. 156). 
Science – so to speak – is the shrine of the pursuit of absolute verity and the diligent 
defence of last and absolute values (p. 229).
53
2.  The second group of clercs form the Judges: like scientists, judges have to be 
independent and they have to serve justice and truth (p. 231). They are responsible for 
 Science is the array of free thinking of 
independent minds that are responsible for preventing society taking a wrong track (i.e. 
pseudo-scientific demagogy, desires of bossiness and ambition). The potential danger that 
comes up within scientific community is infection with the virus of massification and 
stereotyping. Röpke speaks of the danger that science becomes a kolkhoz and a collective 
farm.  
                                                           
51  Röpke in this regard opposes religions in disguise (‘verkappte’ Ersatzreligionen), e.g. nationalism, 
collectivism and biologism (Röpke 1944/1949: pp. 224).   
52 Value judgments are inextricable linked to science; they are not per se illegitimate – to the contrary. Value 
judgments are necessary especially in the context of (justifying) absolute ethical values; cp. on the opposite 
Weber’s postulate of freedom from value judgments (Weber 1904/1968).      
53  According to Röpke, last values are scientifically objective and therefore, legitimate. They refer to 
anthropological facts and elementary, normative-ethical ideals as anthropological constants of the psycho-
physical nature of human beings (Röpke 1944/1949: p. 158). Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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monitoring and implementing the ‘supranational and antecedent to the state majesty of 
law‘. Of great significance are the division of powers, institutional checks and balances, 
and the rule of law. Here, Röpke explicitly opposes arbitrariness, despotism and tyranny.
54
3. Last not least, the Journalists constitute the third group of clercs: Röpke points at the 
eminent relevance of the freedom of the press as well as the sense of responsibility of 
journalists. They have to meet high intellectual qualifications and ethical standards and 
they are highly responsible to save society from political despotism. After all, press and 
media are the fourth estate. The danger that might come up is the unscrupulousness 
regarding the choice of means in order to increase the number of publications of the yellow 
or tabloid press. Additionally, Röpke sees the danger, that newspapers and magazines are 
growingly dependent on advertisement and investors. So, they are compelled making 
concessions to the mainstream and –  as a consequence –  they tend to promote the 
process of massification (pp. 235).        
  
All different kinds of clercs share one moment: they all have equally access to the realm of 
truth, they are holders of the truth and they are pre-destinated to be a part of the elitist and 
meritocratic expert-culture envisioned by Ordoliberalism; they are part of the leading class 
or as Fischer has put it: they belong to the ruling class of the knowing or the reign of the 
knowing (Fischer 1993: p. 149).
55
Clercs are advising politicians and other representatives of the state and the economy. In 
addition – and that is essential for the argument of this paper –, they are mainly in charge 
of modifying the institutional, socio-economic framework of the society. The elitist experts 
are accountable for altering and reforming societal norms (Röpke 1950: 231). Thus, the 
clercs are in a certain way prescribing norms in a paternalistic-heteronomous and anti-
 Röpke sums up the Eucken-like ordering function of 
clercs when he comments: “… nowadays more than ever indispensable leadership by real 
intellectual authority […]. Indeed, when science willingly abandons its own authority, 
whereto should we address ourselves? When science does not show us the way through 
all the chaos of opinions and ideas and when science does not draw up general (ethical) 
guidelines for values and aims – because it is beneath its dignity – to whom can we apply 
and from whom can we expect it?” (my translation of Röpke 1944/1949: p. 152).  
                                                           
54  Equally important is that the hierarchical, elitist and paternalistic concept of the state has not to be 
confused with an authoritarian regime based on violence and oppression (Röpke 1944/1949: p. 245) – thus, 
the accusations put forward by Haselbach and Ptak can be refuted once more.   





3.4. Ordoliberalism and the Quest for Truth 
 manner. The reason for this is that the experts have gained access to the 
realm of absolute truth.  
In his book Mass und Mitte, Röpke criticizes progressism for its alleged nihilism. In the 
eyes of Röpke, nihilism is responsible for destructing the notion of truth and for eliminating 
fundamental ethical values (Röpke 1950: p. 59). Nihilism is highly correlated with 
relativism and so this process ends in  secularisation, emancipation from religion and 
traditions, nomad-like lives, the cult of technology, and proletarianisation with its dissolving 
footholds and disintegrating values and traditions.  
Röpke writes: “The resolute secularisation  of intellectual  contents of our time with its 
bluntness and in the end resolution of religious minds, the decomposition of ultimate and 
transcendental norms, values and beliefs, the ‘nihilism’ in the sense of destructing truth, 
absolute values and the immaterial sense of life and world” (my translation of Röpke 1950: 
pp. 58). “… the urge to get completely rid of anything that seems to constrain the absolute 
self-aggrandisement of humans. It is the advance towards utterly emancipation of the 
human being. The ultimate aim is to cut off the human being from its roots and to break 
away from all bonds and exterior forces […]. The emancipation from all absolutes involves 
a tendency towards total relativisation. Thereby arbitrariness and randomness will become 
domineering. […] No distinct boundaries, no unalterable points, no rigid fundaments that 
stabilize. We are linearly aiming for a world of entire despotism” (my translation of Röpke 
1950: pp. 62).   
What is required in such a situation of massification and stereotyping, a state of an overall 
intellectual-ethical and socio-political crisis, is a return to truthfulness, to an absolute 
secure foundation of values. The only way out is the philosophical search for truth (cp. 
Röpke 1944/1949: p. 25); here, clercs and their ‘service to truth’ (Dienst an der Wahrheit) 
are vital.
57
Eucken in turn aspires to overcome the ‘Great Antinomy’ in economic methodology, the 
Methodenstreit, as well as the (scientific) crisis of humanity by laying a revolutionary new 
  
                                                           
56 Anti-pluralistic in this regard means that the development of norms takes place without the approval of 
legitimate interest groups and without the citizens’ involvement and participation in a democratic decision 
making process (i.e. non-consensus-seeking approach). Not all interest groups are per se illegitimate and in 
danger of misusing their powers in terms of rent-seeking, think of parties, non-governmental organizations, 
etc. – provided that appropriate constitutional checks and balances are implemented. Here, Ordoliberalism is 
overstating the fear of the influence of power groups in an unsophisticated manner.    
57 See Röpke 1933/1965: p. 173: “… the will to emancipate the mind from each heteronomous authority, the 
absolute aspiration for truth while rejecting any kind of obscuration, mythology and of any kind of whatsoever 
engagement. […] intellectual integrity […] the liberal ideal of using ratio in the service of truth” (my 
translation). Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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methodological fundament of science in general and economics in particular: he intends to 
establish  economics as a rigorous and crisis-proof science  –  to use a title of one of 
Husserl’s essays and lectures – and searches for a solid and absolute epistemological 
basis of economics: a search seeking evidence, objectivity, apodictic truth and ultimate 
justification based on an eidetic cognition, as Husserl puts it. Moreover, Eucken’s 
epistemological aim is not only to implement a true, i.e. ultimately justified and crisis-proof 
science.
58 He seeks gaining access to Rudolf Eucken’s realm of truth
59
Via applying an analytical raster which interlinks (Weberian) ideal-type- as well as (Rudolf 
Euckenian and Husserlian) isolating-abstraction-elements it is possible – at least in the 
eyes of Walter Eucken – to deduce theoretical knowledge arriving at (Husserl’s and Rudolf 
Eucken’s) realm of truth. Pointedly distinguishing abstraction simply means 
interpenetration of economic reality, radical turn towards reality, steering towards eidetic 
essences, to essential truth
 as well.   
60
In sum, Eucken’s methodology is therefore an instrument or a tool in order to overcome 
the Gesellschaftskrisis (by reaching the realm of truth via a crisis-proof science) and in 
order to explore economic systems capable of meeting the twofold condition of a 
functioning and humane socio-economic order based on religious values.  
, and the founding of an atemporal valid morphology. The 
feedback of the evident truth of reasons  (Wesenswahrheit; cp. Eucken 1934: p. 29) 
enables the overcoming of the scientific dualism of theoretical and historical economics 
(i.e. Great Antinomy or Methodenstreit); moreover, it allows the founding of a crisis-proof 
science. 
Excursus: Ordoliberalism and Historism 
All this goes along with the ordoliberal antipathy towards historism. Its aim was the 
refutation of historism due to its fostering of relativism, determinism and fatalism. The only 
way of overcoming historism was a new method of thinking in orders and economic 
                                                           
58  By quoting Husserl, Eucken applies directly early  phenomenology to economics. Husserl (as cited in 
Eucken 1950/1992: p. 304) writes: ”The systematic character of a science, if genuine, is not something 
invented, but lies in the facts, and its existence therein has to be discovered. A science must be the means 
by which the realm of truth is extended, and this realm is no disordered chaos but governed by uniformity 
and regularity.”   
59  Rudolf Eucken’s epistemology and methodology  uses a method of abstraction and reduction, and a 
Weberian method of isolating ideal types. He calls this technique noological method which is close by the 
phenomenological approach. He aims at the substance or the being of facts, he highlights the entirety, 
totality, the intuitive, direct and straight look, and the advance towards the essence, and he pursues – in 
complete concurrence with Husserl – the realm of truth (cp. Rudolf Eucken 1918; 1922: pp. 70 and (without 
publication date): pp. 59 and pp. 66; cp. Walter Eucken 1950/1965: pp. 230; Goldschmidt 2002: pp. 80; 
2007: pp. 7 and 2009; see for more information about parallels of the noological and the phenomenological 
method: Goldschmidt 2002: pp. 83, Fellmann 2009; Klump/Wörsdörfer 2010).  
60 Cp. Rudolf Eucken (without publication date): p. 94. Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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constitutions based on the already mentioned phenomenological Wesensschau  (i.e. 
contemplation or intuition of essences).  
As Eucken (1938b: pp. 64) states, historism is responsible for the relativization of all 
religious and ethical norms and values
61
According to Eucken’s own account, who is convinced that we are living in an ‘era of 
historism’, this mental attitude of historism has to be overcome. Historism has to be 
challenged and combated. The decay of science has to be abandoned, the sceptical 
atmosphere towards science has to be ended and the dethronement of ratio has to be 
undone. The real objective of (economic) science is to approach truth and to reach 
veritable and genuine cognition. Additionally, science is responsible  for revealing the 
actual and true connections of the facts of everyday (economic) life, for pushing aside the 
ever changing and subjective ‘surface-opinions’ (Oberflächenansichten), for approaching 
non-relative truthfulness and for the penetration of historical reality in order to understand 
everyday economic experience and in order to solve real problems. Here, Eucken’s belief 
in the power of rational and scientific thinking and in the power of ideas becomes evident. 
The faith in human reason (Eucken 1933; 1938b: p. 74) seems to be limitless and in some 
senses it seems to adjoin hybris.  
 and worst of all for the denial of absolute truth. 
This relativization of the idea of truthfulness (see also Eucken 1950/1965: p. 271) is 
inseparably connected with subjectivism and a distrust in reason, rationality and prudence. 
Science is regarded as a minor subject and it loses its constitutive and ordering function. 
The actual fundamental aim of science is the search for objectively valid knowledge which 
has to be defended at all events against public authorities. However, since the victory of 
historism at the end of the 19
th and the beginning of the 20
th century and since historism 
has become the predominant force and ideology of the present, irrationalism is pervasive 
as well as punktuelles Denken  (unsystematic and selective thinking) and a neglect of 
answering fundamental (scientific) questions and of pursuing pure science and scholarly 
activities. Due to the historic-relativistic mentality with its irrationalism and its idea of a 
deterministic and fatalistic development, science loses its role of analysing and influencing 
historic reality. All ‘scientific’ insight is time-dependent and relative (i.e. Daseinsbedingtheit 
der Wahrheit  and  Daseinsrelativität der Existenz); obligatory and lasting rational 
knowledge does simply not exist – so historism claims. Therefore, science is no longer an 
ethical and ordering power.  
                                                           
61 This questioning of all religious and ethical values is regarded as a serious threat. It will inevitably lead to 
nihilism and a decline in values – so Ordoliberalism claims. Thus, it is highly related with the ordoliberal topic 
of the societal crisis of the present and with its thorough critique of the conflicts in modern civilization.   Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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By intensely discussing (a caricature(?) of) historism, two things become clear. First of all, 
Eucken is again criticizing Schmoller and the Historical School as one major 
representative of historism and, thus, as one major component fostering relativism, 
fatalism and irrationalism and for querying the creative and formative function of science 
(see also Böhm/Eucken/Großmann-Doerth 1936/2008: pp. 32). As said by Eucken, the 
Historical School is not able to explain economic reality; characteristic of the Ethical-
Historical School is its evasion of fundamental questions and of finalizing constitutional 
choices; on the contrary, the Historical School just focuses on minor individual (i.e. 
selective and unsystematic) questions without considering the socio-economic 
interdependencies and without using tools of theoretical methodology. Secondly, what 
becomes clear is the connectedness of unprejudiced love of truth, science and religion: 
Ordoliberalism is not only fighting the decay of reasoning and truth; furthermore, they are 
fighting for eternal and imperturbable values
62
3.5. The Implementation of Ordoliberalism and Social Market Economy
 which help to stabilize and secure individual 
existences in an era which has lost its ethical benchmarks (Eucken 1950). These ethical-
normative values are stemming from human ratio, but in the end, they rest upon God 
(Eucken 1938b: p. 68). The overall aim is to establish an ‚order of truth’ based on ORDO 
as a natural order of essence respectively as an exact image of the order of reason willed 
by God. The ideal normative order, therefore, equals the order willed by God which 
functions as a regulative normative ideal (cp. Eucken 1950/1965: p. 239). 
63
The implementation strategy of Ordoliberalism rests fundamentally on influencing politics 
and the public opinion – especially via educational institutions (i.e. public enlightenment
 
64
The pursuit of hegemony in the scientific community started already in the NS-era when 
several ordoliberal thinkers were working as referees and advisors (cp. chapter 2.3.). Right 
after the collapse of the NS-regime, the ordoliberal expert-counselling continued when 
Eucken and others delivered expert opinions on socio-economic topics to the allies. The 
) 
and via consulting academies and advisory councils (i.e. Eucken’s ordering function of 
science and education). Accordingly, Ordoliberal academics pushed their agenda in both 
the scholarly and popular press. 
                                                           
62 Cp. Miksch 1950: p. 279: “It was a struggle for eternal values of humankind. For him [Walter Eucken], 
economic theory was just a means in order to create an order capable of liberating these values clasped by 
chaotic, anarchistic and collectivistic and fundamentally nihilistic forces” (my translation). 
63 Cp. for foundation: Gutmann 1998; Reuter 1998; Klump 2001; Wünsche 2001; Rittershausen 2007; Körner 
2007; see in particular Ptak 2004: pp. 38. 
64 See also the so called Volkswirtschaftsfibel written by Dietze/Eucken/Lampe (1941/1942), aiming at the 
general education of the public. Accordingly, although the scientific concept of Ordoliberalism is an elitist 
one, elements of general (and democratic) education are incorporated as well (cp. Rüther 2005).   Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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aspiration after cultural and socio-economic supremacy was interconnected with the filling 
of strategic key positions within the sector of political consulting. The overall aim was to 
directly influence political decision makers in order to implement ordoliberal ideals or at 
least to prevent anti-ordoliberal policies. In addition, the Ordoliberals indirectly exerted 
pressure on politics by influencing the vox populi, the public opinion and by being ever-
present in public debates (i.e. media support and media as multipliers).       
According to Ordoliberalism, no more than the scientific experts know what is best for their 
country – based on the assumption that they are the only ones having gained access to 
the realm of truth.
65 Mass influence has to be limited; otherwise the chaotic and anarchic 
forces of the masses will destroy order and security. The masses are often regarded as a 
synonym for an uneducated and uncivilized mob following primitive instincts and 
passions.
66 The majority of the people, the mass population, have to be lead by a strong 
and assertive intellectual elite (i.e. leading by elitist experts).
67
Prior and especially after 1949, scientific counselling was an eminent factor of power and 
the expert culture and intellectual elites framed much of Germany’s post-war history. The 
work of Böhm, Eucken, Miksch, Röpke and others were reasonably influential especially 
with regard to the monetary and economic reform of 1948 (i.e. Leitsätzegesetz/Währungs- 
und Wirtschaftsreform), the anti-cartel legislation (i.e. Monopolies Commission Act and 
establishment of a cartel office in 1958), the monetary policy focusing on price stability and 
the independency of the German central bank (i.e. Bundesbankgesetz, 1957
 
68
                                                           
65 In this context a further similarity between phenomenology and Ordoliberalism can be detected: according 
to Eucken and Husserl, Ordoliberalism/phenomenology is mainly responsible for overcoming mental 
immaturity and reaching autonomy and self-confidence. Transcendental economic ethics/philosophy 
incorporates a claim to ordoliberal/phenomenological leadership similar to that of Platonism (i.e. philosopher 
kings). Ordoliberally/ phenomenologically trained persons are the teachers of the people, they are the 
bearers of rationality, and they teach and educate their milieu until an ordoliberal/phenomenological 
movement and finally an overall ordoliberal/phenomenological society has been established (cp. Husserl’s 
unpublished manuscripts: Ms. K III 9/64a and K VI 334 cited in Klump/Wörsdörfer 2010 and for a similar 
elitist understanding of science Eucken 1952/2004: pp. 338 and Rudolf Eucken 1922: p. 80, where he 
regards himself as an intellectual leader and advisor of the people). 
). Of 
particular importance are furthermore Röpke’s expertise for the Adenauer government Ist 
die Deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik richtig?  (Röpke 1950/1981) and Böhm’s political 
commitment to competition policy (e.g. Law against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz 
gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, 1957) as a supplement of the Fair Trade Law 
(Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb)). 
66 However, it is not correct to state that the masses are a synonym for the poor people. Everyone has the 
chance by educating him-/herself to become part of the intellectual and meritocratic elite (cp. Röpke 1942: p. 
27).  
67 Cp. Ptak 2007: p. 34; 2004: p. 193: “… oriented towards a corporatist structure of society, influence of 
elites rather than masses in the context of political decision making…“ (my translation).  
68  Cp. already Eucken 1923: p. 80, where he additionally pleads for the gold standard; see also 
Dietze/Eucken/Lampe 1941/1942: pp. 81. Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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The so called Brigade Erhard, or as Hutchison (1981/1992: p. 168) put it: Erhard’s 
“satellite economists and experts”, these (academic) supporters of the policy of Ludwig 
Erhard were mainly responsible for implementing, strengthening and securing ordoliberal 
ideals and for consolidating and advancing the Social Market Economy-policy of Erhard 
and Müller-Armack by legitimizing and justifying the newly established socio-economic 
concept as an Irenic Formula and as a Third Way. Furthermore, the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung  (FAZ) and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung  (NZZ) were of eminent 
significance in providing journalistic and in a certain way propagandistic ‘fire protection‘.
69 
This process of legitimizing a new justification narrative was accompanied by the setup of 
a scientific infrastructure at the Federal Ministry of Economy (BMWi) and elsewhere. An 
academic advisory council (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat) was founded in 1948 at the 
Economics Administration in Frankfurt  –  the successor organisation of the so called 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Erwin von Beckerath and the predecessor organisation of The 
German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der 
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung).
70 Among the first members were many ordoliberal or 
ordoliberal-affiliated thinkers like Franz Böhm and Walter Eucken. Other appreciable 
founding members were von Beckerath, Hallstein, Lampe, Liefmann-Keil, Miksch, Müller-
Armack, von Nell-Breuning, Preiser, Rittershausen, Schiller, Veit, and Wessels – to name 
just a few. In the following years, further neo- or ordoliberal think tanks and multiplicators 
have been setup, e.g. the economic-political society WIPOG Wirtschaftspolitische 
Gesellschaft (founded in 1947)
71, Die WAAGE Gemeinschaft zur Förderung des sozialen 
Ausgleichs e.V. (1952-1965), Aktionsgemeinschaft Soziale Marktwirtschaft (ASM, 1953), 
Walter Eucken Institute (WEI, 1954), and the Kronberger Kreis (1982). Internationally, the 
Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS) founded in 1947 provides the ordoliberal program (and Social 
Market Economy) with worldwide credit, acknowledgement and political clout.
72
                                                           
69 Ptak speaks here of an ordering-political indoctrination and of the mythical and legendary triumvirate: 
Erhard – Social Market Economy – Economic Miracle (Ptak 2004: p. 263 and p. 282). 
  In the 
70 See Ptak 2004: p. 256. 
71 Cp. Schulz 1986. 
72  Cp. Plickert 2008. The hour of birth of neoliberalism was the so called Colloque Walter Lippmann, 
organised by Rougier in 1938. The basis for discussion was the book The Good Society written by Lippmann 
(1945). Among the participants of this colloquium were Aron, von Hayek, Lippmann, von Mises, Polanyi, 
Röpke, Rueff, Rüstow et al. (in total 12 of the 26 participants of the Lippmann-colloquium were later among 
the founding fathers of the MPS). Neoliberalism is, thus, a product of the crises of the 1920ies and 1930ies 
(i.e. Great Depression and rise of totalitarianism). What becomes clear right from the start is that the 
neoliberal movement is split into (at least) two poles or camps: the one faction was led by spokesperson 
Ludwig von Mises; the other one was led by Rüstow and Röpke, the two major representatives of 
Sociological Neoliberalism. This subdivision was also characteristic of the first meetings of the MPS. The 
MPS itself was founded in 1947. Among the invited were Friedman, Knight, Machlup, von Mises, Stigler, von 
Hayek, Popper, Robbins, Röpke and Eucken (who later became Vice-President of the MPS). The aim was to 
establish an international network of neoliberal economists. Noteworthy is the fact that the weights within the Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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meantime, some of these think tanks
73 function just like ordinary lobbying institutions with 
all their public relations instruments
74
In sum, the implementation strategy of Ordoliberalism rests on four pillars: after having 
gained access to the realm of truth, Ordoliberalism aims at the circulation and spreading of 
ordoliberal Wirtschaftsordnungspolitik as the only reasonable way of economic policy (i.e. 
the competitive order as the one and only socio-economic order) within the scientific 
community. The first step  is accompanied by an argumentative and in some ways 
ideological fight against opposing and rival economic theories competing for academic 
hegemony (second step) – thus, referring once again to the ideological moment within 
Ordoliberalism (cp. Chapter 2.3.). The third step involves the circulation of the ordoliberal 
‘doctrine’ via multiplicators in the media and in the education sector (i.e. ordoliberal 
academics pushed their agenda in both the scholarly and popular press in order to win the 
battle of ideas) and the fourth and final one  contains the convincing of political, 
administrative and economic decision makers that the ordoliberal alternative is the only 
one guaranteeing individual liberty, social security and justice. All other alternatives will 
lead to a policy based on privileges and arbitrary interventions into the plays of the game 
(mainly induced by the influence of powerful interest groups setting the rules of the game) 
reducing the overall wealth of a society. Therefore, the main focus of the implementation 
strategy lies on influencing the political elite – confirming once again the allegation of an 
elitist and expertocratic societal ideal.  
 shifting their focus from public enlightenment and 
education to rent seeking and thus, diverging from the origins of Ordoliberalism.  
Astonishing is the epistemic optimism displayed by ordoliberal thinkers: they were 
convinced of the malleability of economics and politics with the help of scientists. From 
their point of view, science functions as a corrective containing the influence of interest 
groups and ideologies alike. In the idealistic
75
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
MPS shifted gradually over time. At the beginning, the MPS was mainly dominated by European thinkers and 
a balanced equilibrium between the two poles could be detected within the neoliberal community; since the 
1960ies, however, the MPS is successively dominated by Anglo-Saxon economists and the sociological 
element so characteristic of early neoliberalism faded away (i.e. Sociological Neoliberalism is no longer part 
of the MPS). Especially after the demission of Röpke and the resignation of Rüstow (the so called Hunold-
affair was a major caesura) the transformation of the MPS into a mere economic association began. 
  eyes of Böhm, Eucken and Großmann-
Doerth (1936/2008: p. 27; see also Böhm 1937), scientists are the only objective and 
73 Worth mentioning are furthermore the Initiative New Social Market Economy (INSM) founded in 2000 and 
the Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI) founded in 2005.  
74 Cp. Ptak 2007: p. 75; Candeias 2003/2009: pp. 316. 
75 Here, it should be noted that science is anything but independent of the influence of interest groups. In 
addition, this apodictic belief in the salutary role of science is a special kind of authoritarianism as well. So, 
Ordoliberalism is free of totalitarianism, yet not free of authoritarianism of all kinds – although, they are 
warning against political subordinate mentality (Obrigkeitsdenken). By the way, this is a further aspect of 
repugnancy!  Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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independent advisors due to its position independent of the influence of economic 
interests. Therefore, they have a duty to intervene in public affairs (i.e. relativisation of 
Weber’s postulate of value-free scientific judgements) and help to resolve concrete 
politico-economic problems. Their belief in the ordering power of ratio includes the 
feasibility of (completely) rationalizing public-political debates and discourses; moreover, 
they believed that it is indeed possible to educate and enlighten the public – although 
certain ambivalences exist towards the masses.
76
                                                           
76 Röpke (1933/1965) warns of the tyranny of the masses, he discusses the problem of mass stultification (p. 
168) and he notes that the masses endanger European culture: „Die Masse steht im Begriff, den Garten der 
europäischen Kultur zu zertrampeln …“ (p. 178). Miksch, on the other side, admits that economic laymen 
and the masses will never understand the functioning of the price or the interdependencies of economics 
(Miksch 1949/2008: pp. 164) – pointing once more at the underlying ordoliberal elitism or at least intellectual-
aristocratic tenor (see also Röpke 1963/1965: p. 216). My conjecture is that the ordoliberal (partial) negative 
attitude towards masses is closely related to the mass movement of the NS-regime and that it has its roots in 
NS-ideology which Ordoliberalism abhors. 
 In order to rationalize public debates 
scientific enlightenment, clarification and explanation is indispensable. Additionally, what is 
required is an economic national education (in combination with role-models, i.e. scientists 
that help ordinary people to find their orientation and to establish moral certainties). E.g. 
Eucken has written a Volkswirtschaftsfibel –  together with von Dietze and Lampe – in 
order to educate ordinary people about fundamental economic facts and 
interdependencies (cp. Dietze/Eucken/Lampe 1941/1942; Rüther 2005). And Röpke is 
convinced that it is possible to educate consumers in a way that they build up their own 
autonomous power of judgement, that they withstand suggestive advertisement and the 
mass psychology of promotion and that they are immunized against the allure of 
ideologies and their power of seduction (cp. Röpke 1950: p.  208). It is the mission of 
scientists (and teachers) as the ‘organ of wisdom’ and with their intellectual integrity and 
authority to provide the public with overall and general uninterested and objective 
enlightenment – starting right away in primary schools. Finally, the Ordoliberals believed 
that the advice of expert circles would directly or indirectly influence the composition of a 
new socio-economic order by shaping the ordering thinking of the leading class. People in 
the ivory tower are searching for objective and absolutely valid knowledge and they try to 
implement it by advising the leaders in the world of politics (and economics) how to build 
up a humane and functioning order (Eucken 1947: p. 150).    Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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4. The Genesis of Norms 
4.1. Norms Evolution on the Individual-Ethics Level 
In one of my last papers I draw a distinction between individual and regulatory ethics within 
Ordoliberalism.
77
At the heart of Ordoliberalism are the individual-ethical values (Kantian) liberty and 
autonomy, human dignity, but also Christian maxims like solidarity, benevolence and love 
of neighbour. Other examples of evolutionary developed ethical maxims and norms 
include the Golden Rule, the Decalogue, the do ut des formula, and the tit for tat strategy 
(i.e. an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth). All these kinds of values have evolved 
spontaneously and evolutionary in the course of time and they are formed bottom up by 
local associations (as opposed to a top-down construction): They are to a considerable 
degree the non-intentional (by-)product of evolutionary forces and they have not been 
consciously invented or implemented by deliberate design or a master plan. Instead, they 
gradually evolved along the ‘path of tradition’ over centuries
  The  formal-institutional or regulatory level  encompasses the typical 
ordoliberal framework, the ordering policy and Eucken’s so called competitive order. The 
second level – the so called individual or virtue ethics level – can be subdivided into two 
sections: the first type of individual-ethical norm commitment refers to the religious-
sociological background (i.e. Christian foundation of values), while the second one refers 
to the liberal-Kantian heritage of Ordoliberalism (i.e. Kantian understanding of autonomy, 
freedom and idea of man). Each kind of ethics-level is now subject to different processes 
as related to norm generation. While the individual-ethical level is part of an evolutionary 
genesis of norms (i.e. emergence of norms as a spontaneous process), the formal-
institutional-ethical level is part of an elitist genesis of norms.  
78
                                                           
77 Cp. Wörsdörfer (forthcoming).  
; they were generated 
(through human action, yet not through human design), proved themselves in practise and 
finally became prevalent through experimental trial and error learning processes – first in 
small-scale communities and later on in large, loose-knit and anonymous societies (i.e. 
historically evolved framework of rules and institutions). This kind of genesis reminds the 
reader of von Hayek’s concept of Cultural Evolution (and Poppers’ piecemeal social 
engineering  which allows for perpetual revisions and which provides for the fallibility, 
irrationality, partial knowledge and uncertainty of individuals). According to von Hayek, 
formal as well as informal norms and institutions are mainly an unintended by-product of 
78 Cp. Röpke 1933/1965: p. 169. Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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self-regulating und self-organizing Spontaneous Orders
79
4.2. Genesis of Norms on the Regulatory-Ethics Level 
 and of the dynamic process of 
Cultural Evolution  –  relying on abstract, impersonal and negative general rules (of 
prohibition), making use of de-centrally scattered knowledge (i.e. widely dispersed, hidden 
and tacit knowledge) and the division of knowledge. The spontaneous emergence of the 
market order – to give an example – is not a deliberately intended product of constructivist 
organizations; it is not invented or implemented by deliberate design or a master plan, but 
has gradually evolved over millennia and gone through a constant and ongoing selection 
and learning process. Self-interested individuals are pursuing their own personal goals and 
by doing that they – together with Smith’s invisible hand – ‘create’ a new kind of societal 
order which is not an intentionally created order through planning. Due to its complexity 
and due to unforeseeable coincidences, future socio-economic development cannot be 
predicted and rationally planned. It is up to the individuals and their preferences to choose 
the formal and informal institutions which – in their eyes – have proved to be beneficial and 
valuable in everyday-life and which are, therefore, worth imitating, and which institutions 
on the contrary are not and, thus, should be outperformed. Additionally, new (and highly 
innovative) institutions come into being when they succeed the test of the selection 
process and when they are imitated by a large number of people (cp. Schumpeter’s model 
of innovation and imitation). According to von Hayek and others, this model of cultural 
evolution allows for a highly innovative and prosperous open society. Finally, already 
existing institutions are not rigid, fixed and inflexible always and evermore. Rather, 
(economic) orders can be improved step by step by deliberate reform (cp. Vanberg 2004: 
pp. 8): The political-cultural product, based on a constitutional order requires careful 
cultivation for its maintenance and proper functioning. Vanberg uses in this regard the 
metaphor of a gardener (instead of using the metaphor of an engineer). The economic 
order is not a self-generating and self-maintaining gift of nature but something that needs 
to be actively pursued and cultivated. He also speaks of the competitive order as a care-
dependent park landscape (Vanberg 1997/2008: p. 91).  
So far, parallels between von Hayek and the members of Ordoliberalism exist. However, 
when we take a closer look at the regulatory-ethics level, then we can detect several 
divergences between von Hayek on the one hand and Ordoliberalism on the other hand.
80
                                                           
79  Cp. Hayek 1966/1996: 263; 1970/1996; 1971/2005: pp. 51 and pp. 68; 1983/1996; see also 
Streit/Wohlgemuth 2000 for a comparison between Eucken and von Hayek.  
 
80 Therefore, it is doubtful, whether von Hayek can be classified as an Ordoliberal as stated by Kolev (2010) 
et al. Kolev draws a three-fold division of von Hayek’s work: von Hayek I as the business cycle theorist, von Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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While von Hayek transfers his concept of Cultural Evolution to both kinds of institutions – 
formal as well as informal –, the representatives of Ordoliberalism limit this evolutionary 
and spontaneous concept to the field of informal institutions. In the area of formal 
institutions or in my terminology, the area of regulatory ethics, Ordoliberalism pursues an 
elitist and expertocratic genesis of norms and not a spontaneous or evolutionary one.
81 
The decisive determinant of a new genesis of norms comes from science and academics 
(i.e. constructivist instead of a spontaneous order).
82
Under the condition that science is capable of conquering the three prevalent prejudices 
and resentments, namely positivism, historism and Punktualismus (i.e. isolated and 
selective thinking)
 Sally (1996: pp. 5) concludes: „… 
[Ordoliberalism] is really asking too much of both political intelligence and political practice 
in believing that these principles can be fully and rigidly implemented. There is an element 
of perfectionism and impracticability in the overall scheme. […] its leading lights are rather 
constructivist in the Hayekian sense of the term. There is a faith in human intelligence and 
knowledge to design or make a new order or Ordo, and in the subsequent ability of the 
state to regulate such an order. […] A free order should accommodate highly imperfect, 
irrational and fallible human beings; it should not be designed for saints or even rational 
and intelligent maximisers.” 
83
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Hayek II as the ordoliberal philosopher (i.e. 1930ies-1940ies; the time of The Road to Serfdom and the 
founding of the Mont Pèlerin Society), and von Hayek III as the evolutionist philosopher (starting in 1950ies 
and continuing to the end of his life). What becomes clear is that von Hayek’s arguments underwent 
substantial changes and especially with regard to von Hayek III the distinctions between von Hayek and 
Ordoliberalism become more than obvious –  although some parallels exist especially in relation to von 
Hayek’s Road to Serfdom.    
; it becomes a constitutive, formative and creative ordering power or 
81 For Eucken, a functioning market economic order neither emerges nor prevails spontaneously, but has to 
be generated by science and instituted and protected by the state (Eucken 1952/2004: p. 14 and pp. 372). 
Thus, we can speak of a deliberate framework-setting.    
82  Contrary to Ordoliberalism, von Hayek would probably blame such a concept for its ‘pretence of 
knowledge’.  
83  According to Eucken, positivism  (cp. Eucken’s criticism of Weber’s postulate of freedom from value 
judgments in: 1952/2004: p. 341) runs into the danger of getting swept up into daily politics and the prevalent 
fight of vested interests. Thus, positivism would become increasingly dependent on rent-seeking groups and 
subordinated to socio-political powers. As specified by Ordoliberalism, scientists and academics have to 
stand above power groups and daily business and politics. They have to function as independent 
intermediaries only committed to truth, objectivity and facts (Eucken 1952/2004: pp. 342). The second kind of 
prejudice which has to be overcome is relativism. Historism and romanticism strongly interconnected with 
relativism have begun the flight from reason (see Böhm/Eucken/Großmann-Doerth  1936/2008). In 
consequence, this arbitrary irrationalism and uncritical wallowing in passions and emotions leads to a far-
reaching rejection of the creative power of rational thought (cp. Eucken 1938b). Moreover, relativism and its 
all-pervasive anti-rational views suffer in Eucken’s portrayal from an inherent repugnancy: It denies all 
ultimate values and truth, although it beliefs that this thesis – that truth is only relative to its historical context 
–  is objectively valid (Eucken 1952/2004: pp. 342). The final resentment is related to the advancing 
specialization and fragmentation of science and industries. This development leads to Punktualismus with its 
focus on isolated and selective facts without recognizing socio-economic interdependencies and 
interconnectedness and without overlooking the broader picture beyond all the details (pp. 344). Noteworthy 
is the fact, that Eucken criticises  in this context Schmoller’s (younger) Historical-Ethical School for not Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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ordering potency – besides the state and (possibly) religion (Eucken 1952/2004: pp. 340; 
see also Böhm/Eucken/Großmann-Doerth 1936/2008).  
Science has to study and analyse socio-economic reality in an unprejudiced manner 
relying solely on facts and not on prejudices. A phenomenological method or as Eucken 
puts it, a method of isolating abstraction is required aiming at the essence of being and 
searching for evidence, objectivity, apodictic truth and ultimate justification. As stated 
above, pointedly distinguishing abstraction simply means interpenetration of economic 
reality, radical turn towards reality, steering towards eidetic essences and the founding of 
an atemporal valid morphology. By capturing the essence of being it is possible to get an 
insight into and to gain knowledge about reality. In a second step science will arrive at a 
well-informed and considered (constitutional-economic) leading decision, a 
wirtschaftsverfassungsrechtliche Gesamtentscheidung  (i.e. deliberate constitutional 
choice) which allows for holistic designing and for a deliberate and conscious arrangement 
of terms and orders (bewusste Gestaltung der Ordnungen) (Eucken 1952/2004: pp. 340; 
cp. Eucken 1934: p. 41). The economic order cannot be left to chance but must be 
consciously guided. In the eyes of Eucken, scientific reasoning, thus, is responsible for 
making or at least for preparing such a fundamental decision regarding the institutional 
and legal framework. If science does not take over this task, if it does not fulfil its 
responsibility, the decision will be made by anarchic political and economic power groups 
and their ideologists. This last scenario will lead to group egoism and finally towards 
anarchy, arbitrariness, despotism and to violation of human rights (Eucken 1952/2004: p. 
342).   
By overcoming the three mentioned prejudices and by gaining access to the realm of truth 
and hence generating norms (i.e. elitist and expertocratic genesis of norms), science 
becomes a real constitutive force of the economic, political and social order and is now 
able to influence or to give direction to political, administrative and judicial decision 
makers.
84
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
‘thinking in orders’ and for neglecting the socio-economic interdependencies –  although Eucken praises 
Schmoller’s school for its ethical attitude of social humanism (p. 344; see also Eucken 1937: pp. 562).       
  The implementation strategy is quite similar to the one favoured by 
phenomenology: first of all ordoliberal scientists have to overcome mental immaturity, they 
have to reach autonomy, self-confidence and the realm of truth. This kind of 
transcendental philosophy incorporates a claim to ordoliberal leadership. Ordoliberally 
trained persons are the teachers of the people, they are the bearers of rationality, and they 
84 According to Röpke, the so called clercs are even in charge of modifying the institutional, socio-economic 
framework of society; the elitist experts are responsible for altering and reforming societal norms (cp. Röpke 
1950: 231). Thus, clercs are in a certain way prescribing norms in a paternalistic-heteronomous and anti-
pluralistic manner – all that because these kinds of experts have gained access to the realm of truth.  Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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teach and educate their milieu – starting at the top of the societal hierarchy by influencing 
and warping decision makers like politicians, judges and journalists and proceeding in 
concentric circles until an ordoliberal movement and finally an overall ordoliberal society 
has been established. This is what actually happened right after World War II (cp. chapter 
3.5.).  
Before coming to a conclusion, a further point is worth mentioning: the two kinds of 
genesis of norms – the evolutionary and the elitist one – are not independently of one 
another; rather they are mutually dependent and correlative. The norms of regulatory 
ethics aim at safeguarding individual-ethical ideals; regulatory ethics functions as a 
guarantor of freedom, human dignity and a humane socio-economic order. So, this kind of 
level is interlinked with the individual-ethical conception of liberty based on religiosity as 
well as Kantianism. In other words: the elitist genesis of norms of the competitive order is 
responsible for safeguarding the individual ethical norms which evolved over time in an 
evolutionary manner. Even if both levels and both kinds of genesis of norms are 
interdependent, a contradiction turns up: this inconsistency refers to the incompatibility and 
irreconcilability between Kantianism as one normative fundament of Ordoliberalism resting 
on autonomy and the paternalistic and elitist notion of norms resting on heteronomy.           
5. Concluding Remarks 
The argument of this paper was structured as follows: in the first part, several kinds of 
criticism forwarded against Ordoliberalism were analysed –  critique stemming from 
Catholic social ethics, from Ptak and Haselbach accusing Ordoliberalism of authoritarian 
liberalism, and objections raised by Foucault and Governmentality-studies. In the second 
part, one class of critical review – the accusation of elitism and expertocracy with its truth 
claim (Wahrheitsanspruch) – was evaluated in particular by studying the primary literature 
of Ordoliberalism. In the final part, a distinction between an evolutionary and an elitist 
genesis of norms was drawn building up on the differentiation between individual and 
regulatory ethics.  
What becomes clear right from the start is that the main representatives of Ordoliberalism 
in a strict and in a wider sense belief in science as an absolute and that their program 
rests upon a philosophical search for absolute truth. Consequently, this unprejudiced love 
for truth and its retrospective dependence on objective and generally valid range of values 
and truth independent of any subjectivity, arbitrariness and randomness (Rückbindung an 
objektiven Werte- und Wahrheitsbereich), corroborates the verdict of an elitist-hierarchical 
and expertocratic thinking. According to Ordoliberalism, no more than the metaphysical Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
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and transcendental realm of truth
85 guarantees an ideal-typical order. Thus, by gaining 
access to that realm of truth and by implementing the entirely valid socio-economic order it 
is likely to overcome the multi-dimensional and interlinked crises: i.e. the societal crisis 
respectively the crisis of contemporary culture (cp. Ordoliberalism in the wider sense 
including Rüstow and Röpke), the crisis of intellectual life (cp. Rudolf Eucken’s Krise des 
Geisteslebens), the crisis of capitalism (cp. Walter Eucken) and the crisis of science and 
scientific justification (cp. Walter Eucken and Husserl who postulate a twin-crises, a crisis 
of science intertwined with a crisis of European manhood).
86 Furthermore, it is feasible to 
fight the different ideologies of interest groups (Interessentenideologien
87) and to 
‘scientificate’ politics (‘Szientifizierung der Politik’
88
This critical review of Ordoliberalism might be used in order to draw a distinction between 
the two ways of genesis of norms and furthermore, to hint at a far-reaching incompatibility 
inside Ordoliberalism which has to be taken into consideration when reforming and 
updating the ordoliberal program of freedom and human dignity (i.e. Kantian autonomy vs. 
paternalistic and elitist heteronomy).  
).  
At the end, two questions remain open: first of all, is Ordoliberalism standing in the natural 
law tradition and if so, in which category fall natural right arguments – into the evolutionary 
one or into the elitist genesis of norms? Secondly, and more importantly, we have to 
debate the in-between position and the special role played by (the late?) Franz Böhm who 
just played a minor role in my essay due to different reasons. Especially in his 1950 and 
1966 essays remarkable parallels between Böhm and von Hayek exist as well as 
differences compared to the position held by Eucken (cp. Sally 2003: p. 34). Here, Böhm 
describes the ordoliberal Ordo as a pre-established harmony which has to be discovered, 
yet not created. The societal order is not invented by humans; rather, it has to be detected. 
Evolutionary reminiscences can also be found in terms of the genesis of norms: Böhm 
admits that norms evolve in a supra-individual manner: according to him, they are the 
‘product’ of a cooperative order which allows for game-like experiments, trial and error 
processes and voluntary transactions and exchange processes via markets. Compare the 
following quotes relating to von Hayek’s concept of cultural evolution: “… daß es solche 
Signalsysteme tatsächlich gibt, daß sie im Laufe ganzer geschichtlicher Zeiträume mehr 
                                                           
85 This is a direct rebuttal of Pies’ thesis that Eucken pursues a metaphysics-free Ordnungstheorie and a 
solely economic research agenda (cp. Pies 2001: pp. 8). Instead, Eucken mixes metaphysical and religious 
elements with scientific ones – all together embedded in a broader socio-economic and cultural framework.  
86  Hence, the parallels between Husserl, Rudolf and Walter Eucken are not restricted to the field of 
methodology as often claimed (see also Renker 2009). 
87 Cp. Eucken 1938a: pp. 13 and 1950/1965: pp. 12: rational-objective and true scientific judgments vs. 
subjective ideologies of interest groups respectively science vs. ideologies. 
88 Ulrich 1997/2008: p. 394.  Ordoliberalism and the Evolution of Norms 
33 
 
oder weniger ohne Zutun planender Staatsgewalt, ja sogar ohne Zutun bewußter 
menschlicher Einsicht durch unbewußt intelligentes Alltagsverhalten zahlloser 
Generationen von Individuen zurechtgeschliffen und zurechtpoliert worden sind“ (Böhm 
1966/1980: p. 118). Or the following one referring to the peculiarity of market prices as an 
indirect, yet superior steering technique (i.e. inherent and highly sensitive intelligence 
incorporating numerous data and informations): „Marktpreise sind Lenkungssignale, in 
deren Entstehungsprozeß und Urteilsfindung mehr natürliche und soziale Daten eingehen 
und verwertet werden, als dies bei jeder denkbaren anderen Art des Lenkens möglich ist“ 
(Böhm 1966/1980: p. 123). In contrast to the previous mentioned quotes taken from 
Böhm’s late work, see his work Die Ordnung der Wirtschaft als geschichtliche Aufgabe 
und rechtsschöpferische Leistung  dating from 1937, in which Böhm holds a reverse 
position. In this book, Böhm claims, that the socio-economic order is not the result of an 
evolutionary process; rather, it is the product of a conscious, professional and authoritarian 
(sic!) decision of political leaders (Böhm 1937: p. 56). In addition, Böhm is convinced that 
the indirect steering of markets via competition and price mechanisms has to be 
complemented by the direct method of steering accomplished by state authorities. He 
even speaks of authoritarian market regulation and market control by state command and 
he concedes price-fixing by the state, expropriation and socialization of private property 
(pp. 161), which is all highly incompatible with his late work. Von Hayek would speak in 
this regard of pretence of knowledge. Finally, it becomes clear, that Böhm’s early work is 
quite uncritical of the economic policy of National Socialism and that he places great faith 
in public authorities (p. 146) – sometimes, he even uses the terminology of NS-ideology. 
As a result, we conclude, that Böhm’s argument was subject to a profound change during 
his lifetime. In sum, it seems appropriate to classify Böhm in a certain way as a missing 
link  and an intermediary between Eucken and von Hayek linking the ordoliberal topic 
Gesellschaftskrisis (cp. Böhm’s Himmelsgabe, his Tatwelt-essays and his monograph Die 
Ordnung der Wirtschaft als geschichtliche Aufgabe und rechtsschöpferische Leistung and 
especially pages 46-47) with von Hayek’s concept of cultural evolution. The work of Böhm 
deserves further investigation with a special emphasis on a comparison between Böhm’s 
early and his late work and with regard to the distinction presented in this paper between 
an evolutionary and an elitist genesis of norms. 
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